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MATHEMATICAL MODELLING OF DECISION 
MAKING PROCESSES IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
Daisaku Nishiyama1 and Milan Radosavljevic 
School of Construction Management and Engineering, University of Reading, Whiteknights, PO Box 
219, Reading, RG6 6AW, UK 
Many different individuals, who have their own expertise and criteria for decision 
making, are involved in making decisions on construction projects. Decision-making 
processes are thus significantly affected by communication, in which a dynamic 
performance of human intentions leads to unpredictable outcomes. In order to theorise 
the decision making processes including communication, it is argued here that the 
decision making processes resemble evolutionary dynamics in terms of both selection 
and mutation, which can be expressed by the replicator-mutator equation. To support 
this argument, a mathematical model of decision making has been made from an 
analogy with evolutionary dynamics, in which there are three variables: initial support 
rate, business hierarchy, and power of persuasion. On the other hand, a survey of 
patterns in decision making in construction projects has also been performed through 
self-administered mail questionnaire to construction practitioners. Consequently, 
comparison between the numerical analysis of mathematical model and the statistical 
analysis of empirical data has shown a significant potential of the replicator-mutator 
equation as a tool to study dynamic properties of intentions in communication. 
Keywords: mathematical modelling, decision making, communication. 
INTRODUCTION 
The notion of decision making appears in a wide range of arguments on construction 
research, such as construction contracts (Murdoch and Hughes 2008), ethics in 
construction activities (Fewings 2009), project management (Fewings 2005, Walker 
2007), and human resource management (Loosemore, Dainty and Lingard 2003). 
Their common arguments are that many different individuals, who have their own 
expertise and criteria for decision making, are involved in making decisions on 
construction projects. From a historical perspective, the arguments regarding 
optimisation and rationalisation have been popular in the construction management 
research to find an optimal solution by computers (e.g. Hua 2008). Such arguments 
are in line with the development of decision support systems. 
Does an optimum solution found by computers become a final decision in the 
construction world? Even if an optimum solution is obtained, it is unavoidable to 
communicate with people involved in order to make a final decision. Cairns (2008) 
made a similar point: 
It is acknowledged that, at the level of the local, discussion between involved actors 
will elicit a variety of perspectives that are informed by different theoretical and 
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conceptual standpoints, underpinned by different beliefs and values, and influenced by 
the power relations and the politics of those involved.(Cairns 2008)  
This suggests that the communication among individuals who have different 
intentions is arguably an important element of decision making in construction.  
Can a holistic model of decision making processes including communication be built? 
It is a research aim to provide such a mathematical model of decision making. In order 
to realise this aim, one of the mathematical formula in evolutionary dynamics was 
borrowed here, namely the replicator-mutator equation (e.g. Komarova 2004). Then, 
the questionnaire survey was conducted for the validation of the mathematical 
modelling. 
EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS 
Evolutionary dynamics is the mathematical description of evolution, which is based 
on selection and mutation (Nowak 2006). In light of history, the theory of evolution 
has become more mathematical over time. This trend in evolution can mean that 
verbal approaches to evolutionary perspectives have become unsatisfactory. In fact, 
evolutionary dynamics has been applied to a variety of academic topics, which are 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The contemporary applications of evolutionary dynamics 
 Outline of argument 
Infectious diseases 
and evolution of 
cancer 
The mechanism of disease progression and cancer progression is explained by 
evolutionary dynamics. For instance, the following questions have been argued: 
how the balance of power between virus and the immune system can impact the 
outcome and how long it takes for a population of reproducing cells to inactivate a 
tumour suppressor gene. 
Games and evolution 
of cooperation 
Games including the Prisoner's Dilemma are represented by introducing a payoff 
matrix in evolutionary dynamics. An important question is how natural selection 
can lead to altruistic interactions. The nature of cooperation and defection is 
analysed. The evolutionary game dynamics is explained with "the replicator 
equation." 
Evolution of human 
language 
A theory describing the deterministic evolutionary dynamics of grammar is 
constructed by means of combining three different worlds: formal language theory, 
learning theory, and evolutionary dynamics. It has been argued about how children 
learn grammar, and how a population can evolve grammar. The fundamental 
equation is "the replicator-mutator equation." 
Note: based on Nowak (2006) 
In particular, applications of evolutionary dynamics to the evolution of cooperation 
and language are of the essence because of the arguments on the social phenomena. 
Furthermore, the arguments are based on a deterministic differential equation (i.e. the 
replicator-mutator equation), which can not only reach an equilibrium, but also 
demonstrate oscillations and chaos (Nowak and Sigmund 2004). The equation is given 
as follows: 
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dynamics. Meanwhile, the mutation probability from type i  to type j  is denoted by
ijq , which are entries of the mutation matrix. The average fitness of the population is 
∑
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The coefficients ija  are entries of the payoff matrix. The equation (1) is the most 
generalised deterministic description of evolutionary dynamics. Interestingly, it can be 
transformed into adaptive dynamics and the Price equation and also can be used for 
models of language evolution (Nowak and Sigmund 2004).  
In the model of language development, the dynamics is based on a communicative 
sense that individuals who communicate successfully are more likely to influence 
language acquisition of others. The interactions within the linguistic community (i.e. 
children learn the language of their parents) are described by communicative functions 
based on the payoff matrix, ija , while the language acquisition is given by the 
mutation matrix, ijq .  
Meanwhile, another important application of the replicator-mutator equation is the 
evolution of cooperation. In this case, where mutation is negligible, the replicator-
mutator equation becomes the replicator equation which describes selection only. The 
nature of cooperation is condensed in the payoff matrix, which considering the game 
between two types of option, A and B, is given by 
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(4) 
In general, there are four outcomes (i) Dominance: B disappears, if A is the best reply 
to both A and B (i.e. a>c and b>d). (ii) Bistability: Either A or B disappears, 
depending on the initial condition, if each option is the best reply to itself (i.e. a>c and 
b<d). (iii) Coexistence: A and B coexist in stable equilibrium, if each option is the 
best reply to the other (i.e. a<c and b>d). (iv) Neutrality: The frequencies of A and B 
do not change, if each option fares as well as the other for any composition of the 
population (i.e. a=c and b=d) (Nowak and Sigmund 2004). 
From the two applications of the replicator-mutator equation, it becomes clear that the 
payoff matrix is related to the feature of social interaction in the population, while the 
mutation matrix has a connection with the competence of success in the interaction. 
For example, the hierarchical relationship between hawks and doves can be 
represented in the payoff matrix (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). Then, the probability 
of change from one intended matter into another can be incorporated into the mutation 
matrix. 
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APPLICATION TO DECISION MAKING 
Communication in decision making processes 
Communication is dynamic and unpredictable in terms of uncertain outcomes. In 
general, communication is defined as any process where orders, information, and 
advice are transmitted from one agency to another (Simon 1997). Despite of the media 
of communication, whether it is oral or written, the transmittal of information affects 
people’s deliberations. Philosophically speaking, deliberation is structured by 
intentions and also ends up in actions (Bratman 1987). Therefore, intentions in 
communication are regarded as a basic element in decision making processes. 
Human intention is inseparable from the individual action, which is the basic building 
block of explanation for social science, such as management theories (Elster 1983, 
Ghoshal 2005). Of course, construction management is no exception in that individual 
action is guided by intentions. For instance, decision-making based on morality and 
ethics, which are related to intentions and are articulated in the difference of concepts 
between good/bad or right/wrong, is comprehensively argued in the field of 
construction management with an increase in closer relationships in construction 
projects (Fewings 2009).  
Originally, the concept of intention, which has been argued by philosophers (e.g. 
Anscombe 1963, Davidson 1980), characterises both people's actions and their minds 
(Bratman 1990: 15). For example, the expression of doing something intentionally is 
concerned with actions, while the description of intending to do something or having 
an intention concerns the sense of minds. Philosophically, intention can be defined as 
an element of deliberation on deciding to do something (Bratman 2007).  
Strictly speaking, intention is different from decision, but essentially influences 
decision. Decisions, which are the upshot of deliberation between options, are made in 
a specific context, while intentions are independent of context (Bratman 1999). 
Namely, intention has more general sense than decision. In theory, a wide variety of 
decisions, which have been made in different contexts, result in the formation of 
intentions. Such mutual interactions give decisions the pressure to be compatible with 
intentions themselves. That is why the agents have to coordinate various activities 
over time. From this perspective of intrapersonal conflict, intentions essentially 
influence every decision through coordination. 
Moreover, in a social setting to make a decision, coordination is required in 
interpersonal relationship, which is characterised by communication (Bratman 1999). 
Suppose two participants in a construction project intend to lay a pavement together. 
One intends to make it all asphalt, another intends to make it all concrete. They know 
each other's intentions, but they are not willing to compromise. In this case, it is usual 
that they communicate with each other in order to decide which pavement is good and 
right for the project. Apparently, the communication will lead to a decision, but it can 
depend on their relationship such as colleagues, rivals, professional and amateur, or 
superior and inferior. If they are colleagues or rivals, then the decision can rely only 
on rational comparison between asphalt and concrete in terms of value for money. If 
they have a relationship between professional and amateur, then the professional can 
refute the amateur's intention by persuading him to give up his idea. If they have a 
clear hierarchical relationship between superior and inferior, then the inferior can have 
no choice but to obey the superior, regardless of his intention. In this way, 
interpersonal relationship involving communication affects a decision vitally. 
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Analogy of decision making processes with evolutionary dynamics 
Decision-making processes are similar to evolutionary dynamics in terms of 
interaction-based phenomena. The similarities are summarised in Table 2. In 
evolutionary dynamics, there are three variables: the initial frequency, )0(ix , the 
payoff matrix, ija , and the mutation matrix, ijq . These variables can be interpreted in 
the decision making processes as follows: the initial support rate, the authority, and 
the power of persuasion. The initial support rate can be interpreted as a function of 
rational comparison between options. Authority is a power in which a subordinate 
would accept his behaviour to be guided by the decision of a superior, and the superior 
would just obtain his acquiescence regardless of convincing him (Simon 1997). In 
contrast, persuasion is a kind of power to make others act in an intended way by 
confidence, which makes sense as mutation. Interestingly, it is argued that power can 
exist without authority, and that authority works without competence (Keltner, 
Gruenfeld and Anderson 2003, Anderson and Kilduff 2009). As argued, there are 
various combinations of the variables in addition to the number of options. In the case 
of two options, there are at least 48 possible patterns, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Similarities between decision making processes and evolutionary dynamics 
Decision-making processes Evolutionary dynamics 
Initial frequency of individuals who have the 
same intention in a group 
Initial frequencies of types in population 
↓ ↓ 
Communication between different individuals 
with business hierarchy and persuasiveness 
Interaction with selection (Game) and mutation 
on the basis of reproduction 
↓ ↓ 
Group Decision (e.g. agree/disagree)  Equilibrium (e.g. survival/extinction), oscillation, 
or chaos 
 
Table 3: Patterns of variables in decision making processes 
 Initial support rate Authority (Selection) Power of persuasion (mutation) 
X1(0)>X2(0)  
Option 1 has a 
greater initial 
support among 
participants.  
X1(0)<X2(0)  
Option 1 has a 
lower initial support 
among participants.  
X1(0)=X2(0) 
Both options are 
equally supported 
among participants. 
Dominant 
Either option has higher fitness, due to 
higher-ranking people's supports.  
Neutrality 
Both options have the same fitness because 
participants hold equivalent positions.  
Bistability 
Each option is the best reply to each 
supporter.  
Coexistence 
Each option is the best reply to the other 
supporter. 
q11=q22=1 
Both options have strong 
persuasion. Each supporter is 
convinced in his selection.  
q11>q22 
Option 1 is more convincing. 
q11<q22  
Option 1 is less convincing. 
 q11=q22=const. 
Both options have similar 
persuasion, although it is not 
strong. 
3 patterns  4 patterns 4 patterns  
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METHODS AND SAMPLE 
In order to evaluate the patterns of decision making, self-administered mail 
questionnaires were distributed to 550 practitioners of construction works. The 
questionnaires include demographic questions and hypothetical questions concerning 
some patterns of decision making, which are identified in Table 3. The design of 
hypothetical questions consists of seven critical scenarios, where the factors 
considered were the initial support rate (greater/even/lower), the business hierarchy 
(higher/equivalent/lower), and the power of persuasion (more/even/less). All scenarios 
include two options to be selected on a 7-point Likert scale (1: extremely unlikely; 7: 
extremely likely). The data of the scale have identified to what extent each option 
would have potential to be agreed in the scenario, as well as whether the scenario 
itself has occurred. An example of the questions is as follows: 
 
Statistical analysis including two-sample t-test, which is aimed at clarifying effects of 
the three factors in the scenarios, has been performed on the data by using Instat+ for 
Windows; Version 3.036 (2006, The University of Reading, UK).  
Consequently, 78 people responded within 45 days after commencing the distribution 
at the end of February 2009 (i.e. the response rate was 14%). The general information 
from the respondents is summarised in Table 4. The majority of respondents belong to 
local authorities in the UK (59%) and work as senior managers (53%). 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of respondents 
Location Profession Age Gender Sector Employee number  
London 
10.26%(8) 
Director 
12.82%(10) 
0-20 years 
1.28%(1)        
Male 
90.67%(68) 
Construction 
23.08%(18)     
20 or less 
8.97%(7)        
England 
74.36%(58) 
Senior manager 
52.56%(41) 
21-30 years 
7.69%(6)       
Female 
9.33%(7) 
Consultancy 
15.38%(12)     
21-50      
7.69%(6)        
Wales 
1.28%(1) 
Middle/junior 
manager 
23.08%(18) 
31-40 years 
23.08%( 18)    
 Local 
Authority 
58.97%(46)     
51-200 
23.08%(18)       
Scotland 
14.10%(11) 
Others 
11.54%(9) 
41-50 years 
33.33%(26)     
 Others 
2.56%(2)       
201-500 
24.36%(19)       
Northern 
Ireland (0)  
 51+years 
34.62%(27)     
  501 or more 
35.90%(28)       
Total (78) (78) (78) (75) (78) (78) 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The results of the seven scenarios to be investigated are summarised in Table 5. Apart 
from this table, the practicality of all scenarios is supported by the majority of 
respondents (around 70%) in terms of whether scenarios have occurred in real-life 
situations. With respect to each scenario, there were significant differences between 
the two options in five scenarios (i.e. scenario 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7), while the other two 
did not make significant differences (i.e. scenario 3 and 4).  
For example, scenario 2; where colleagues involved hold equivalent hierarchical 
positions, showed a significant difference that option 2 which has lower initial support 
among colleagues but is more convincing, is more likely to be agreed among people 
than option 1 which simply has a much greater initial support (i.e. mean probability of 
4.5 as opposed to 4.0). Conversely, there was no significant difference between the 
two options (i.e. mean probability of 4.0 each other) in scenario 3; where the people 
involved hold different hierarchical positions, are all 100% convinced in their selected 
options, and the higher-ranking people prefer option 2. 
Furthermore, comparison of some options beyond scenarios has been conducted in 
order to clarify the effects of the three variables on decisions, as shown in Table 6. It 
is largely interpreted that the business hierarchy is more effective than the power of 
persuasion, and the power of persuasion is more influential than the initial support 
rate.  
On the other hand, aside from a statistic point of view, meaningful changes have been 
seen in the comparison between scenario 1, 2, 5, and 7. In scenario 1, option 1, which 
has greater initial support among people, tends to become agreed, while in scenario 2, 
where the power of persuasion exists, the more convincing option (option 2) slightly 
prevails over option 1. Then in scenario 5, where the business hierarchy appears, 
option 1 that higher-ranking people like prevails over option 2 again. Finally, for 
scenario 7, the result that option 1 prevails remains as was the case for scenario 5, 
regardless of the difference in initial support rate.  
These meaningful outcomes above can be described by manipulating the variables of 
the decision making based on equation (1), as illustrated in Figure 1. Of course, the 
values of variables used in the figure are all assumption, but surely they follow the 
qualitative categories of patterns of variables (e.g. neutrality or dominant). Perhaps, it 
is another research to identify the specific values of variables.  
Nevertheless, the figure depicts an interesting characteristic that even though an 
optimum option in terms of rational comparison is greatly supported among people, it 
is not necessarily the final decision among people. The unreasonable feature of 
decision making absolutely relies on communication, which is given by the three 
variables: initial support rate, business hierarchy, and power of persuasion. Therefore, 
it is considered that unpredictable outcomes (e.g. bribery or collusion) can appear. 
This is how the change of intentions through communication can shed light upon 
complex decision making. 
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Table 6: Interpretations of the results of the seven scenarios 
Scenario Option Probability to be a 
final decision 
Interpretations  
1 1 Likely Initial support works 
 2 Unlikely  
2 1 Unlikely Persuasion > Initial support 
 2 Likely  
3 1 Could be Initial support = Business hierarchy 
 2 Could be  
4 1 Could be Initial support + Persuasion = Business hierarchy 
 2 Could be  
5 1 Likely Initial support + Business hierarchy > Persuasion 
 2 Unlikely  
6 1 Likely Business hierarchy works 
 2 Unlikely  
7 1 Likely Business hierarchy > Persuasion 
 2 Unlikely  
 
Table 5: Results of the seven scenarios 
Sce
nari
o 
Opt
ion 
Variables* Means 
(1 to 7) 
Differences 
(Op.1-Op.2) 
 
Standard 
errors of 
difference 
Statistical 
significance (two-
sided t-test) Initial support  
Business 
hierarchy 
Persu
asion 
1 1 +   5.000 1.9310 0.1998 Significant 
 2 -   3.069   (P=0.0000) 
2 1 +  - 3.984 -0.4831 0.2160 Significant 
 2 -  + 4.467   (P=0.0272) 
3 1 + -  4.000 -0.0377 0.2289 NS 
 2 - +  4.038   (P=0.8694) 
4 1 + - + 4.204 0.3148 0.2438 NS 
 2 - + - 3.889   (P=0.1994) 
5 1 + + - 4.691 1.0909 0.2194 Significant 
 2 - - + 3.600   (P=0.0000) 
6 1  +  5.322 2.4255 0.1922 Significant 
 2  -  2.897   (P=0.0000) 
7 1  + - 4.259 0.4317 0.2098 Significant 
 2  - + 3.827   (P=0.0420) 
‘Greater, higher or more: + /even or equivalent: "blank" /lower or less:  -’ are given respectively. 
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